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Abstract Is globalization promoting regulatory convergence in agricultural biotechnol-
ogy policies in the South? This article examines the nature and limits of regulatory
convergence in the field of agri-biotechnology and investigates the effects that interna-
tional forces have on biotechnology and biosafety policies in developing countries. Based
on detailed case studies of Mexico, China and South Africa this article shows that these
three leading biotechnology countries in the South are exposed to powerful international
influences but are responding to the regulatory challenges of genetically modified organ-
isms (GMO) adoption in distinctive ways. The existing regulatory polarization between US
and EU biotechnology approaches has not forced a convergence around either of these two
international models. GMO policies in the South do not simply follow the binary logic of
the US–EU regulatory conflict. Instead, they integrate elements from both regulatory
approaches and are steering a course that suggests substantial regulatory diversity in the
South. The globalization of biotechnology thus goes hand in hand with regulatory diversity
in the developing world. Furthermore, regulatory polarization between the EU and US has
helped to open up political space in key developing countries.
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1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the globalization debate is the extent to which globalization
fuels cultural, political and/or economic homogeneity. One facet of this debate relates to
regulatory convergence—the trend towards a growing similarity in national-level regula-
tory institutions, processes and outcomes. Over the last half-century, the twin processes of
economic globalization and international institution-building have produced an unprece-
dented level of convergence around the world. Both public and private actors have set
about integrating national markets by establishing common international standards and
removing national barriers to the free movement of goods and services. Trade liberaliza-
tion through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and since 1995 under
the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been a key driving force behind
this trend.
In this context, pressures for regulatory convergence in the realm of trade in genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) have also arisen. In this policy domain, however, it is now
widely acknowledged that, instead of convergence, two competing regulatory approaches
dominate the global landscape: the more permissive approach of the United States (US),
which assumes, unless proven otherwise through ‘sound scientific’ risk assessments, that
products of genetic engineering pose no novel threat to environmental or human health;
and the more restrictive approach of the European Union (EU), which justifies precau-
tionary restrictions on GMO use and trade, even if scientific knowledge about risks is
uncertain.
A burgeoning literature now exists on the causes and consequences of this transatlantic
divergence in GMO regulatory approaches, in particular for US–EU relations. Less
attention has been paid to how this ‘‘regulatory polarization’’ between the US and EU
impacts upon developing countries. It is this latter question that interests us here. Of those
who have analyzed GMO policymaking in the South, some tend to assume that developing
countries will have to follow either the US or EU model in their domestic policy choices
or, at the very least, that transatlantic regulatory polarization limits developing country
policy options (see Sect. 2). Such accounts tend to privilege international influences in
explaining domestic policy choices.
In contrast, this article argues that the debate on regulatory convergence versus polar-
ization has been cast in terms that are too narrow. Through a comparative analysis of key
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developing countries, we show that greater regulatory diversity exists in the developing
world than the binary logic of polarization around EU versus US approaches implies.
Although developing countries are faced with powerful external constraints and incentives,
in the case of GMO policies we find that competing trade imperatives interact with
domestic politics and priorities, with multiple nodes of power and actor coalitions nego-
tiating policy directions that combine elements of both US and EU regulatory approaches
within a given country. An intriguing implication of our analysis is that the ongoing
transatlantic conflict creates room for manoeuvre that key developing countries can exploit
in order to chart their own course in this socially and politically contested area of risk
regulation.
The analysis proceeds in four steps. Section 2 reviews existing research on the rela-
tionship between globalization and regulatory convergence, with particular emphasis on
the case of agricultural biotechnology. Section 3 discusses the international context for
GMO policymaking in the South, including the transatlantic biotechnology conflict and
global trade and biosafety regimes. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis of biosafety
policy in selected developing countries. We conclude by stating our findings about glob-
alization and policy convergence (or lack thereof) in the South.
2 Globalization: promoting regulatory convergence?
Much of the recent globalization debate has focused on the question of whether global
economic integration is making national policies more similar across the world. Scholars
have examined domestic responses to globalization and trends towards convergence in
macroeconomic and sectoral policies (Keohane and Milner 1996), regulatory policies
(Vogel and Kagan 2002) and broader development of political–economic institutions in
capitalist systems (Hall and Soskice 2001). Most empirical studies have been conducted on
convergence effects in the industrialized world, particularly in a European or transatlantic
setting (for an overview, see Heichel et al. 2005).
It is important to clarify at the outset, how we use the concept of ‘convergence’, as it has
provoked some discussion and even confusion among researchers (Knill 2005). Since the
early 1980s, convergence has been seen as ‘‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike,
to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances’’ (Kerr 1983, p. 3; see also
Drezner 2001, p. 53). We focus here on ‘regulatory convergence’, i.e. the growing simi-
larity of institutional frameworks, policy approaches and outcomes in the field of
regulatory politics. All three elements are relevant, for we seek to capture the evolution of
legal institutions as well as changes in policy content and outcomes. In other words,
regulatory convergence can occur at any or all of these levels, with ‘convergence’ itself
understood as a process rather than an outcome (on the latter, see Bennett 1991, p. 219).
The early globalization literature narrowly focused on whether convergence was hap-
pening or not. More recently, scholars have examined in great detail the mechanisms
through which globalization impacts upon domestic politics. Among the most widely cited
drivers of convergence are (i) political harmonization, i.e. deliberately negotiated agree-
ments to adjust national policies (Simmons 2001; Singer 2004); (ii) regulatory competition
and upward or downward adjustment of national policies as a consequence of global
competitive pressures (Rodrik 1997; Vogel 1995); and (iii) policy diffusion and learning,
in which political actors voluntarily adjust policies based on innovative policy models
(Busch and Jo¨rgens 2005; Levi-Faur 2005).
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Our analysis builds on, but also departs from, this established research focus. Not only
do we consider if convergence is happening and why (or why not), but our study also shifts
the focus away from industrialized countries to developing countries, which only com-
paratively few studies have focused on to date (see the overview of empirical studies in
Heichel et al. 2005). We also depart from the usual binary framing of the debate, which
tends to view convergence as an either/or question, and ask how international and domestic
factors work together, overlap or compete with each other in shaping domestic policy
responses to globalization.
The literature on convergence in the GMO policy domain has followed a similar tra-
jectory. Early analyses suggested that globalization of agricultural biotechnology (and
development of global regulatory regimes) might fuel convergence, with the debate cen-
tering on whether such convergence would be towards higher or lower standards. Some
scholars originally hypothesized that a nascent ‘trading up’ effect between the EU and the
US was at work, which would lead to greater convergence between the two main con-
tenders in international norm-creation on GMO trade, in the direction of the EU’s more
stringent approach (Prakash and Kollman 2003; Young 2003). Others pointed to corporate
interest in convergence between global regulatory approaches and the global pressures on
states to create ‘‘common means by which to identify and manage risks associated with
GM products’’ (Newell 2003, p. 63).
But this expectation has now given way to a more widespread recognition that such
trading up is not proceeding far and fast enough, and that convergence in this policy
domain is unlikely. In fact, two regulatory approaches now dominate in an international
context: the restrictive precautionary EU approach versus the permissive ‘‘sound science’’
based US approach (Falkner 2007; Murphy and Levidow 2006), giving rise to regulatory
‘‘polarization’’ in this area of policymaking (Bernauer 2003; Drezner 2007).
Much recent research has focused on the causes and consequences for transatlantic
relations of such polarization. Less attention has been paid to the question of how this
global rift is impacting on countries of the South. Where analysts have considered bio-
technology policy choices in the developing world, many have tended to privilege
international factors in explaining domestic policy choices, suggesting that the transatlantic
conflict not only shapes but also limits Southern policy options. Drezner (2005, p. 856)
suggests, for example, that ‘‘divergent preferences among large states… lead these actors
to attract as many allies as possible. In a bipolar distribution of power, the result is a
bifurcation of policies, but strong policy convergence at two different nodes’’. Bernauer
(2003, p. 117) points to the negative implications for the South of transatlantic regulatory
polarization, suggesting that it may be responsible for reducing returns on investment in
agro-biotechnology, and deterring public and NGO support for biotechnology (see also
Paarlberg 2001).
We provide a deeper empirical basis for examining these claims in the literature, viz.
that EU–US regulatory polarization is driving, and ultimately restricting, developing
country policy choices. A dichotomous view of Southern biosafety approaches does not,
we argue, do justice to the growing complexity of policy choices observable in key
developing countries and to the continuing diversity of GMO policies in the South.
Our arguments fit into a broader trend in the globalization literature that provides an
alternative interpretation of how globalization affects domestic politics. In this view,
globalization can co-exist with, or even enhance, regulatory diversity. As some sceptics
noted early in the debate, globalization is not a straightforward story of global homoge-
nization (Appadurai 1996; Rosenau 1995), nor is convergence always desirable (Sykes
1999). Global economic integration has not eliminated diversity in national policies
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(Wade 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996;), with convergence occurring only under
restrictive conditions (Hay 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). In particular, the mediating force
of domestic institutions and domestic politics may facilitate a persisting diversity in
national responses to globalization (Weiss 1999; Biermann 2002).
Similar perspectives are also identifiable within writings on GMO politics. In a rela-
tively early and prescient analysis of GM policy choices in the South, Millstone and
Zwanenberg (2003, p. 655) suggest, that ‘‘the tendency towards convergence is severely
attenuated’’, as long as certain conditions are met, such as compliance with (broadly
defined) procedural requirements contained in biosafety-related treaties. They also suggest
that persisting scientific conflicts with regard to GMO safety provide leeway to countries,
including in the South, to pursue divergent choices (see also Gupta 2004). Others who have
emphasized divergent rather than convergent responses in the South have attributed this
diversity primarily to trade imperatives (Clapp 2006), rather than to scientific conflicts,
international treaty obligations or domestic politics more generally.
In sum, scholarly research on globalization and its domestic impact has shifted from an
initial focus on whether convergence is occurring to a closer examination of ‘‘the ways in
which, paradoxically, globalization produces diversity as well as promoting lines of con-
vergence’’ (Hopkins 2002, p. 18). A fruitful way to engage with this question is in issue-
and policy-specific contexts (Heichel et al. 2005). Our analysis is in line with such an
approach. We focus on international–domestic linkages and the influence of domestic
politics in modulating external pressures towards regulatory convergence or polarization in
GMO policy choices in the South.
3 The global context: EU–US conflicts and regulatory regimes
In first laying out the external context for GMO policymaking in the South, we discuss
further the divergent US and EU regulatory approaches to GMOs. We then review the
obligations that global trade and biosafety regimes place on countries, and assess their
affinity (or lack thereof) with the divergent EU or US approaches.
3.1 The transatlantic GMO conflict
The first regulatory frameworks for dealing with the environmental and health risks of
GMOs stem from the 1970s (for an overview, see Wright 1994). The US as a frontfronner
has long emphasized scientific and industry self-regulation in biotechnology, and has been
largely promotional in its regulatory approach. The 1986 ‘Coordinated Framework for the
Regulation of Biotechnology’, which established key regulatory principles and divided
authority between different agencies, sets out rules for a product-based approach to risk
regulation. Following the principle of ‘substantial equivalence’, according to which
genetically modified plant varieties do not pose fundamentally different risks vis-a`-vis
conventionally bred varieties, US authorities have allowed a large number of GM crops to
be tested, planted and introduced to the market. US regulations apply a narrow definition of
GMO risk, focusing on scientifically proven harm to humans and the environment
(Bernauer 2003; Sheingate 2006).
Well into the late 1980s, most European countries adopted a similarly ‘light-touch’
approach to regulation. Following the strengthening of the EU’s environmental compe-
tencies and rising concerns over biotechnological safety in a number of member states, the
EU sought to harmonize the uneven regulatory field in Europe and adopted a more
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precautionary approach in dealing with GMO risks. In 1990, the EU established a
European-wide system of biosafety regulation (Directives 90/219/EC and 90/220/EC) that
institutionalized a process-based approach with comprehensive coverage of all GMO
developments. In sharp contrast to the more limited US approach, the EU-based risk
assessment and management on the precautionary principle, which legitimizes regulatory
intervention to avert potentially serious or irreversible harm under conditions of scientific
uncertainty. The 1990 directives were later revised and strengthened to include GMO
traceability and labelling requirements (Pollack and Shaffer 2005; Levidow 2007).
These two models of GMO regulation—one product-based and emphasising ‘sound
science’-based risk assessment, the other process-based and covering a wider set of risks
under the precautionary principle—have undergone some modifications since the 1990s
but remain more or less intact. As a consequence, the two most powerful players in
international biotechnology are now promoting two rival regulatory standards. Interna-
tional GMO politics is characterized, as Drezner puts it, by ‘‘a single global cleavage’’
(2007, p. 169).
Both the US and the EU have sought to export their regulatory models to the inter-
national level, as well as to other countries (Bernauer and Aerni 2007). The two most
important international regimes, where the transatlantic conflict has played out are the
World Trade Organization and its Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS), and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety under the Convention
on Biological Diversity. Potential conflicts between these regimes, and their affinity with
US or EU regulatory approaches, are considered in the next section.
3.2 Global GMO governance regimes: WTO versus the Cartagena Protocol
The WTO’s SPS Agreement seeks to prevent national sanitary (human and animal health)
and phytosanitary (plant health) measures from becoming non-tariff barriers to trade. It
does so by calling for adoption of international standards in the areas of human, animal and
plant health and safety, where these exist. In the absence of international standards, or if
countries want to adopt higher standards, the SPS Agreement mandates that these be based
upon scientific risk assessment, with only limited (time bound) allowance for trade-
restrictive precautionary measures. Furthermore, to be compatible with the WTO, label-
ling, traceability, segregation and other GMO policy choices should flow from such a
science-based decision-making process. This ‘sound science’ based approach is, in its
broad contours, largely compatible with the US regulatory approach to GMOs.
The global rule-making effort with the potential to weaken the WTO’s push for trade
promotion is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, negotiated under the Convention on
Biological Diversity and in force since 2003. It explicitly seeks to enhance importing
country choice with regard to traded GMOs. Developing countries pushed for the Protocol,
with strong support from the EU in the final stages of its negotiation (Bail et al. 2002).
The Cartagena Protocol requires the ‘advance informed agreement’ (AIA) of an
importing country prior to trade in certain GMOs. In operationalizing AIA, it mandates, as
does the WTO-SPS Agreement, that importer decisions about GMO trade be based upon a
scientific risk assessment (Cartagena Protocol, Article 15). However, it permits precau-
tionary restrictions on trade in the face of scientific uncertainty. Unlike the WTO-SPS
Agreement, the Cartagena Protocol does not require a time frame within which precau-
tionary restrictions must be reviewed, thus allowing more flexibility in restricting GMO
trade (Gupta 2008a; Millstone and Van Zwanenberg 2003). The Cartagena Protocol on
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Biosafety is thus more closely aligned with the EU’s regulatory approach to GMOs, and
has not been ratified by key GMO exporting countries, including the US.
Not surprisingly, the Protocol’s relationship to the global trade regime remains con-
tested and has become the focus of much scholarly attention (e.g. Young et al. 2008). The
goal here is not to analyze regime conflicts in an international context, but rather to turn the
lens of inquiry to look at their impact and relevance from a domestic policy perspective in
the South. Below, we undertake detailed analysis of GMO regulation in three key countries
of the South, and examine the international and domestic influences shaping the directions
of national GMO policy.
4 Regulatory convergence in the South? Examining the evidence
Although their accuracy is hard to ascertain, recent figures suggest that use of genetic
engineering in agriculture is rapidly expanding, particularly in key globally traded com-
modity crops, such as maize, soybean, canola and cotton. Both developed and developing
countries are growing GM crops, with the US, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India and China
accounting for 118.3 million ha or 95% of the total worldwide GM crop area (James
2008). An estimated 300 million tonnes of grains, oilseeds, pulses and other crops are
traded each year globally and the ongoing liberalization of agricultural markets is likely to
increase agricultural trade in the future. This global commodity trade, now containing a
sizeable quantity of GM varieties, is thus of particular commercial significance to both
exporting and importing countries. The influence of this on domestic policy choices is
likely to be greatest for countries that participate in this global commodity trade, either as
exporters or importers of one or more crops subject to genetic modification.
In our empirical work, we focus on Mexico, South Africa and China.1 We select these
countries because, first, they are at the forefront of domestic biotechnology research and
development. Thus, agricultural biotechnology is a key economic, environmental, political
and social issue in these countries, necessitating the development of domestic regulatory
policies. All three countries also participate in the GMO trade as importers of GM crops
(with varying trade relationships with the US and the EU), requiring them to mediate
competing global influences, including transatlantic regulatory polarization, in determining
domestic policy directions.
In analysing the directions that GMO policy is taking in these countries, we first discuss
the general context for biotechnology use and development in each. We then analyze GMO
policy directions, highlighting both permissive and restrictive elements. We ground our
analysis in qualitative methods of social science, including fieldwork in the countries and
detailed semi-structured interviews with policy-makers representing diverse state interests
(including agriculture, health, environment, economy, science and technology policy,
foreign affairs and trade), as well as stakeholder representatives including scientists, civil
society groups and the private sector.2
1 Although Mexico is a member of the OECD, in areas of relevance to agricultural biotechnology it exhibits
key characteristics of a developing country: a relatively large proportion of the population is engaged in
agriculture, particularly subsistence farming; and the country is a centre of origin and diversity of key crops
subject to genetic engineering, such as maize.
2 Interviews with regulators and stakeholders were conducted in China in August 2004, in Mexico in June
2004 and in South Africa in May 2005. In order to respect interviewees’ requests for anonymity, only their
institutional affiliation is revealed here.
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4.1 GMO policies: the context
4.1.1 Support for biotechnology in the context of trade liberalization
Each of the three countries has embraced biotechnology at the highest levels, as part of an
overall thrust towards technology promotion, trade liberalization and a desire for greater
integration into world markets.
Mexico, for example, is heavily integrated into regional and global markets, including
agricultural markets. Until the 1970s, Mexico prioritized self-sufficiency in the production
of basic food grains. Following the 1982 debt crisis, the country embraced trade liberal-
ization and privatization and scaled back long-established programs of price supports and
direct subsidies to small-scale agriculture. Mexico acceded to the GATT in 1986, became
part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1994. It was also the first country
in Latin America to sign a free trade agreement with the EU—its second most important
trading partner after the US. Biotechnology policy in Mexico is inextricably tied into this
move towards trade liberalization and global integration. Mexican participation in
NAFTA, in particular, has been influential in shaping domestic policy choices, particularly
given that GM maize imports from the US have soared in recent years as a result (Fitting
2006).
Since the 1970s, China has moved from near total economic isolation to growing
integration into the world economy. Entry into the WTO in 2001 further accelerated
liberalization of agricultural trade that had been under way in the 1990s. Biotechnology has
been an integral element of China’s agricultural strategy since the mid-1980s. In an effort
to boost agricultural productivity and scientific capacity, the Chinese state has expended
the largest public spending program on biotechnology in the developing world and is now
in a leading position in advanced biotechnology research outside the industrialized world
(Lakhan 2006). Public funding for biotechnology research has steadily risen with every
new five-year plan, and biotechnology experts predict another dramatic rise to as much as
$1.4 billion for the next five-year plan (Hepeng 2008).
Technology promotion and market competitiveness are also key considerations in
determining biotechnology policy directions in South Africa. Encouragement of biotech-
nology dates back to 1978, when a South African Committee for Genetic Experimentation
was constituted to encourage research in molecular biology and biotechnology (Sasson
2000). In the 1980s, with support from the government, new biotechnology research
centres were established. Beginning in the 1990s, South Africa became one of the first
countries to undertake field trials and environmental releases of GM crops. Government
support of modern biotechnology is evident from a 2001 National Biotechnology Strategy,
which outlines a vision for biotechnology’s role in ensuring South Africa’s technological
leadership in the 21st century (NBS 2001).
4.1.2 GM crops: domestic imperatives and trade relationships
All three countries can be considered as early adopters and developers of GM crops in the
South, with China the most advanced in its biotechnology capacity. Mexico, for example,
has permitted field-testing of GM crops since 1988, when the first government approval
was issued to Monsanto for Bt cotton. Since then, a range of GM crops, produced primarily
by the private sector, have been approved for field-testing. While the private sector focuses
on corn, canola, cotton and soybean, GM crop development is also underway in the public
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sector (Herrera-Estrella 1999; see also Massieu et al. 2000). According to one set of
estimates, Mexico now ranks 13th amongst countries worldwide growing GM crops, with
0.1 million ha devoted mainly to commercially grown GM cotton and soybean (James
2008).
China was the first country worldwide to grow a GM crop in commercial quantities, a
virus-resistant tobacco plant (Paarlberg 2001, p. 128). Since the mid-1990s, over a dozen
GM crops have been approved for large-scale field trials, of which three (cotton, tomato
and petunia) passed safety tests for commercial planting as early as 1997 (Huang and
Wang 2003). Of the GM crops approved for introduction to the market, only GM cotton
has since been grown on a large scale by an estimated 7.1 million farmers. In total, an
estimated 3.8 million ha of GM crops were grown in 2007, making it the sixth biggest GM
crop grower worldwide (James 2008).
In South Africa, as in Mexico, development and commercialization of transgenics
remains largely the domain of the private sector. Crops approved for commercialization
since 1997 include insect-resistant and herbicide-tolerant varieties of maize, cotton, and
soybean, with many of these developed by Monsanto (Morris et al. 2005). South Africa is
also the first country to commercialize GM white maize, a staple food crop of its popu-
lation. While the public sector is involved with GM research (focusing on crops, such as
potato, sugar cane, maize and strawberries), most products have yet to be commercialized.
A growing number of GM crop varieties have received general release approval and/or
commodity clearance, i.e. approval to be imported for use as food or feed (Morris et al.
2005). By latest estimates, South Africa is now the eighth largest GM crop grower in the
world, with 1.8 million ha planted mainly to GM maize, soybean and cotton. (James
2008).
All three countries participate in the GMO trade as importers. For Mexico, the US is the
most important trading partner. Imports of GM maize from the US (for the animal feed and
food processing industry) continue to fuel controversy and conflict in Mexico, given that
maize is at the centre of the national diet and is of enormous cultural, political and social
significance.
The opening of China’s farm markets has led to a sharp rise in agricultural imports,
especially in GM soybeans (mainly from the US) for domestic food processing and animal
feed. It has also, however, increased exports (to the EU, Japan) in areas, where China
maintains a leading position, such as rice. The gradual enmeshment of China’s agricultural
system with world markets has led to a complex web of dependencies that have mixed
effects on domestic biotechnology commercialization.
For South Africa, the US and Argentina are key trading partners for crops subject to
genetic engineering, such as maize and soybean. Although Europe is South Africa’s most
important agricultural trading partner, this is not yet the case for crops subject to genetic
modification. Of the GM crops approved for general release in South Africa that may enter
international trade, currently only cotton is exported to Europe (Wolson 2006). Impor-
tantly, however, trade considerations vis-a`-vis other African countries opposed to GM
crops are also increasingly important in determining directions of South African GM
policy.
As can be seen from the above, international trade links are likely to shape policy
choices in the developing world. In our three cases, agricultural trade liberalization has if
anything heightened sensitivity to trade policy imperatives in recent years. Notwith-
standing this, as Gourevitch reminds us, the international system ‘‘has many dimensions,
with multiple, often conflicting incentives, confusing signals, complex information’’ (2002,
p. 310). We also need to take into account other external factors, such as development of
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international environmental norms through the global biosafety treaty, and uptake of these
in a domestic context. All such international factors find resonance in domestic politics
through the mobilization of domestic interests both within and outside the core state.
4.1.3 Ratification of the Cartagena Protocol: domestic imperatives
All three countries, while promoting use of biotechnology in agriculture at the highest
levels, have also participated in negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and
have ratified it, owing largely to domestic imperatives.
Mexico, for example, ratified the agreement in 2003, although its NAFTA partners, the
US and Canada, were vocal opponents of the Protocol during its negotiation and neither
has since ratified it. One reason for Mexico to ratify was to give domestic policy-makers
the option to withstand NAFTA and global trade imperatives through reference to their
global biosafety rights and obligations, should it become necessary to do so. By many
accounts, ratification was also stimulated by the success of Ministry of Environment
officials in persuading Mexican legislators of its importance during parliamentary debates
on ratification (interviews with Ministry of Environment officials).
China maintained a low profile during Cartagena Protocol negotiations, where it par-
ticipated as a member of the developing country negotiating bloc (designated the Like-
Minded Group of countries). Although China appeared to be more conciliatory towards
GMO exporter concerns than other developing countries (Lijie 2002), in the end, it sup-
ported the final compromise in the biosafety talks and, after some protracted domestic
debates, ratified the treaty in June 2005. The decision to accede reflected the growing
strength of domestic elite support for a strengthened biosafety agenda, but also China’s
broader desire to achieve full integration into international society (Falkner 2006).
South Africa also participated in the Cartagena Protocol negotiations as part of the Like-
Minded Group, although tensions surfaced between South Africa and other developing
countries during early stages of the negotiations. Observers explain South African ratifi-
cation of the Protocol as politically unavoidable, given the country’s emphasis on
multilateralism since the early 1990s and its desire to show solidarity with other African
countries. The timing of ratification is also significant because it happened just before the
World Summit on Sustainable Development in August 2002. With South Africa playing
host to the key sustainability event of the decade, Protocol ratification was an important
signal of its support for multilateral environmental processes (interview with a civil society
representative).
As seen above, all three countries are leaders in biotechnology research and develop-
ment in the South. All are participants in the GMO trade with varying ties to the US and the
EU as key trading partners. Moreover, all have ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
and are subject to its obligations. What mix of permissive and restrictive policy choices
does this result in? We analyze next how external factors are transmitted into domestic
politics by tracing the evolution of GMO policy in China, Mexico and South Africa.
4.2 GMO policy directions: restrictive and permissive elements
4.2.1 Regulatory frameworks, institutions and actors
All three countries examined here were among the first to develop domestic biosafety
regulations, given their trajectory of GMO research and development dating back to the
late 1980s. In Mexico, the first law governing GM crops was a set of standards (the
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Mexican Official Standard NOM-056-FITO-1995, or NOM-056 for short) developed under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture and in force since 1995 (Chauvet and Galvez
2005). The NOM-056 established procedures for field-testing of GM crops but did not
address large-scale planting and commercialization. Partly as a result of this, and partly
because of domestic ratification of the Cartagena Protocol, a comprehensive Biosafety Law
was developed, which replaced NOM-056 in 2005. Regulations to implement this Law
have only recently been published in early 2008, paving the way for legally developing,
testing and planting GM crops (Cevallos 2008).
Controversies around GM crops in the late 1990s and Mexico’s participation in the
international biosafety negotiations left a clear mark on the institutional set-up of the
regulatory system. While the Ministry of Agriculture was the key locus for regulatory
oversight of GM crops in Mexico throughout the 1990s, other government departments
became more involved from 1998 onwards. The Ministry of Environment, in particular,
has gained more influence in domestic biosafety debates, not least because it is the lead
agency for Cartagena Protocol implementation. Under the 2005 Biosafety Law, it has also
been given a stronger voice in approving GM crops for deliberate release. With the earlier
NOM-056, the Ministry of Environment had merely an advisory role, with the final
decision resting with the Ministry of Agriculture.
To counter intra-governmental fragmentation and coordinate biotechnology policy more
effectively, Mexico also established an inter-agency commission, the Inter-Sectoral
Commission on Biosafety and Genetically Modified Organisms (CIBIOGEM), in 1999.
CIBIOGEM has since been criticized by critics for failing to outline a vision for appro-
priate use of biotechnology in Mexican agriculture (interview with Ministry of Economy
official), suggesting continuing difficulties in reconciling competing priorities within the
regulatory system.
In the case of China, the early development and commercialization of biotechnology
proceeded without proper regulatory oversight into the early 1990s. In 1993, the Ministry
of Science of Technology (MOST), then the lead agency in the field of biotechnology,
established the Safety Administration Regulation on Genetic Engineering, a set of general
safety rules drafted largely by scientists for scientists. In 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA) followed this up with Implementation Guidelines and became the lead agency in
the regulatory process. The MOA guidelines were informed by a desire to promote bio-
technology and concentrated on scientifically demonstrated risks (Paarlberg 2001,
p. 129)—a position that tended to downgrade the importance of long-term and uncertain
threats from GMOs to human health and environment. Given its close links with the
agricultural and biotechnology sectors, MOA is widely seen to favour the commerciali-
zation of GM crops, preferably those developed by domestic biotech firms (interviews with
representatives of biotechnology industry and Chinese Academy of Sciences).
The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), which was promoted to minis-
terial level in 2008 and renamed Ministry of Environmental Protection, was, however, the
lead agency for Cartagena Protocol negotiations. This permitted greater weight to be given
to environmental concerns in developing China’s position, and SEPA was able to move out
of its relative marginalization in domestic biotechnology regulation. With the adoption of a
new national seed law in 2000, the final managerial authority over all new GM crop
varieties passed to the State Council, a central decision-making body at cabinet-level.
The State Council’s new Regulation on Safety Administration of Agricultural GMOs of
2001 was followed in 2002 by three implementing regulations issued by MOA, covering
the areas of biosafety evaluation, import safety administration and GM food labelling.
These new acts provided a more comprehensive system of risk management, for the first
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time regulating imported GMOs and providing consumers with some degree of choice over
GM food content. Efforts have since been made to create a comprehensive biosafety law in
China, which would replace the existing system of regulations, but these have so far failed
to come to fruition (interview with SEPA official).
The regulatory process in South Africa, as with Mexico, also dates back to the late
1980s. Initially, research and field-testing of transgenics was regulated under the 1983
Agricultural Pests Act (Sasson 2000). The first general release of transgenics in South
Africa in 1997 coincided with adoption of a separate biosafety law. As in the case of
Mexico, this law was advocated by biotechnologists who felt the need for a legal regime to
lay down acceptable practice in this area (Morris et al. 2005; interview with a public sector
biotechnologist).
The Genetically Modified Organisms Act (henceforth GMO Act) was passed in 1997
and implemented in 1999 (GMO Act 1997). It is administered by the Ministry of Agri-
culture but decisions on GM crop applications are taken by consensus by an Executive
Committee, consisting of representatives from the Ministries of agriculture, health, envi-
ronment, science and technology and trade. This ensures that all represented government
departments can, in theory, veto specific applications. The capacity to raise concerns in the
Executive Committee tends, however, to vary significantly between government depart-
ments (interview with a representative of civil society).
As in the other countries, biosafety rules continue to evolve in South Africa, with
amendments to the 1997 GMO Act approved by Parliament in 2006, following a long and
contentious domestic debate (e.g. Mayet 2004). The amended GMO Act has been criticized
by civil society groups for its weak liability clauses, lack of mandatory labelling
requirements, and unclear guidance with regard to when a risk assessment, environmental
impact assessment or socioeconomic impact assessment is necessary (e.g. Biowatch 2006).
This brief overview shows that putting into place a domestic GMO regulatory system
remains as an ongoing process in all three countries. Different laws and regulations have
come into existence but domestic struggles over their implementation and legal revision
continue unabated. Neither do these laws and regulations express a clear political com-
mitment to either the US or EU regulatory approach. As will be discussed next, both
restrictive and permissive elements of GMO policy can be identified in all three countries’
evolving regulatory systems.
4.2.2 Regulatory directions: restrictive elements of GMO policy
Notwithstanding the overall supportive environment for GMO use in each of these
countries, restrictive elements are discernible in each. The restrictive elements of Mexican
biosafety policy are largely related to intense controversies over GM maize (e.g. ETC
Group 2002). One prominent example of a restrictive policy is a 1998 moratorium on
release of GM maize into the environment. Even though the moratorium was lifted for
experimental trials in mid-2004, no planting of maize has been legally authorized in
Mexico since then, not least because regulations to implement the 2005 Biosafety Law,
which now governs experimental testing of maize, remain to be developed. This puts
Mexico at odds with the situation north of its border, in the US and Canada, where GM
maize has been rapidly commercialized.
The GM maize controversy received extensive global attention in 2001 following an
article in Nature magazine suggesting that transgene ingression into indigenous maize
varieties had occurred in Mexico’s Chiapas region (Quist and Chapela 2001). The source
was believed to be GM maize imports from the US, intended for the food, feed or
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processing sector. This resulted in another restriction in Mexican biosafety policy: an
amendment to the Mexican Penal Code in 2002 making it a criminal offence to store
unapproved GM crops or release them into the environment. This move galvanized some
of the country’s leading biotechnologists into action, making them active proponents of a
comprehensive biosafety law to replace existing policies, including the moratorium. In
their view, such a law was essential in order to provide a legal basis for GM research
(interview with public sector biotechnologist).
The Mexican Academy of Science was the main architect of the resulting 2005 Bio-
safety Law (interview with representatives of Mexican Academy of Science and civil
society). Although the biosafety law has been criticized for promoting biotechnology rather
than operationalizing a precautionary approach to GM crop use, it does call for a special
regimen for GM maize, to prevent release into areas of the country that are centres of
origin. This requires demarcation of GM maize-free zones, and regulations to implement
this are being developed only now (Cevallos 2008). This has meant that the de facto
moratorium on planting of GM maize, has, in effect, remained in place for over a decade.
Questions remain, however, over its effectiveness, given that imports of GM maize for
food, feed or processing continue unabated from the US, with few monitoring or oversight
mechanisms in place (interview with civil society representative).
China too imposed a temporary de facto moratorium on new GMO releases in 1999.
The timing of this move—shortly after introduction of an informal EU moratorium on
GMO authorizations in October 1998 and shortly before adoption of the Cartagena Pro-
tocol in January 2000—is significant. It signalled the growing impact that global GMO
debates were having on regulatory developments in China—despite the government’s
hitherto unambiguous support for the development of GM crops. The moratorium was also
a sign that Chinese authorities implicitly acknowledged shortcomings in the regulatory
framework and moved to create new domestic regulations.
A key factor why the moratorium has largely remained in place is the threat of exclusion
from important export markets. In 2000, EU authorities detected GM content in Chinese
shipments of soy sauce to Europe, leading to a temporary ban on such imports. Although
soybean production was officially GM-free, China’s imports of GM soybeans from the US
and domestically developed GM soybean varieties in field tests were suspected of having
contaminated soybean production. More recently, unauthorized GM rice varieties were
detected in shipments to the EU, leading to a European Commission emergency decision in
February 2008 requiring GMO-free certification for rice or rice products from China (Mahr
2008). Such import restrictions in key export markets are widely cited to have contributed
to the continuing moratorium on authorizations of important crop staples such as soybean,
wheat and rice (interviews with representatives of SEPA and Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences), giving rise to an informal ‘baptist-and-bootlegger’ coalition between agricultural
exporters and biosafety supporters in SEPA and civil society groups.
In South Africa, a very active local NGO community is constantly striving to slow GM
crop approvals, via filing detailed objections to the ever-increasing body of GM crop
applications.3 Although largely unable to stem the tide of approvals, particularly in the
early years of GM development, such NGO activity has had some notable successes. One
success was to foil an attempt by Monsanto in 2004 to get approval to import GM wheat
into the country, before it had received regulatory approval in the US. The company
withdrew its application following objections lodged by the African Center for Biosafety
(ACB 2004). Environmental organizations, in particular Biowatch, have also consistently
3 See, e.g. the detailed objections by the African Center for Biosafety at www.biosafetyafrica.net.
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demanded access to information with regard to GM crop approvals from the government,
with highly publicized and long-drawn out court cases (Biowatch 2008; see also Gupta
2008b).
In recent years, a trend towards a slowing of GM crop approvals is discernible in South
Africa (Wolson 2007). One clearly restrictive move came in late 2005, when the Executive
Committee responsible for evaluating and approving GM crops decided not to consider any
further applications for GMO commodity imports, pending the outcome of a study by the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) about the impacts of such imports on South
African trade and agriculture. By some accounts, the concerns motivating this step include
potential adverse impacts of cheap GM imports on domestic maize and other commodity
producers. Trade unions, powerful domestic players in South African politics, are con-
cerned about the price effects on local commodities of cheap GM imports in the long term
(Wolson 2007, p. 189). Another concern is the impact on non-GM exports to countries in
the region, given that segregation between GM and non-GM varieties of key export crops
cannot be assured. Although the DTI study was to be concluded in 2006–2007, official
results of the study do not appear to be available. Meanwhile, the moratorium on approvals
for commodity imports is still largely in place (Mayet 2006.).
The perception of a more restrictive trend in policy is reinforced by a number of high
profile rejections of GM crop applications. These include an application to fieldtest a bio-
fortified variety of sorghum, produced by a consortium of public and private sector actors
and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Wolson 2007); and another to
import the ‘first biofuel GM’, a GM maize variety produced by Syngenta for more efficient
production of biofuels. The official reasons cited for these rejections included a mix of
economic, trade and food safety concerns. Whether this cautious trend continues is likely
to depend as much on regional and national imperatives and domestic alliances, as on
global developments.
As is evident from all three cases, a combination of concerns relating to biosafety,
domestic price stabilization, export markets and overall economic impacts of GM crops
have given rise to actor coalitions that have sought to slow down the commercialization of
GM crops. Environmental campaigners and various state officials have been strengthened
by the creation of an international biosafety regime, and where the introduction of GM
crops posed a threat to agricultural exports or domestic producers, they were able to bolster
their efforts to enforce stricter biosafety oversight with economic arguments, often against
a broadly promotional stance by key state institutions.
4.2.3 Regulatory directions: permissive elements of GMO policy
At the same time, each of the three countries has also adopted a more permissive approach
in certain areas. In Mexico, this relates, first, to GM cotton and its commercialization. In
this case, gaps in the regulatory framework were creatively interpreted to portray large
areas—exceeding 10,000 ha—as experimental fields still requiring biosafety measures.
This permitted the large-scale planting of Bt cotton, the first GM crop grown in com-
mercial quantities in Mexico. Because cotton does not end up in the food chain for humans,
it has so far escaped closer scrutiny by those concerned about food safety.
Permissive elements of Mexican policy are, however, also evident for maize, fuelling
much greater controversy. The most prominent of these is the ‘trilateral arrangement’ that
Mexico has signed with its NAFTA partners, the US and Canada, in order to fulfil its
obligations under the Cartagena Protocol. The arrangement is intended to implement the
Protocol’s requirement that bulk commodity shipments (in this case, those coming from the
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US into Mexico) state that they ‘‘may contain’’ GM varieties. The trilateral arrangement
mandates that the ‘‘may contain’’ declaration only be triggered in cases, where the content
of GM material is above a threshold of 5%, which the US has been pushing for in an
international context. Consumer safety and environmental groups see this threshold level
as too high, and as being counter to the precautionary intent of the Cartagena Protocol. By
many accounts, this controversial agreement was negotiated by a representative of the
Ministry of Agriculture and is not unequivocally supported by all government departments
(interview with a CIBIOGEM member and Ministry of Economy official), reflecting
ongoing conflicts over GM policy directions in Mexico.
GM maize imports from the US are set to increase even further, as all special exemptions
for maize under NAFTA expired in January 2008. The importance of this burgeoning trade to
Mexico has also been responsible for Mexican opposition at the global level, during
Cartagena Protocol meetings, to strengthening documentation requirements for the GM
commodity trade, as demanded by developing countries and the EU (Osava 2006).
As in Mexico, GMO policy in China too has been largely permissive in relation to GM
varieties of cotton. Insect-resistant GM cotton varieties passed regulatory hurdles and were
introduced in four provinces as early as 1997 (Hebei, Henan, Shanxi and Shandong),
including the first and so far only foreign-owned GM plant variety, Monsanto’s Bt cotton.
Because cotton is primarily grown for the domestic market and does not enter the human
food chain, trade concerns did not stand in the way of rapid commercialization, involving
an estimated 7.1 million farmers (James 2008).
With regard to other crops, in particular GM soybean, the threat of exclusion from
international markets has been a driving force behind the tightening of China’s biosafety
regime, as seen above. However, domestic demand for agricultural imports pulls in the
opposite direction. Owing to rapidly growing domestic consumption and the liberalization
of agricultural trade, China has now become the world’s largest importer of GM soybeans,
mainly from the US, and domestic operators of crushing and processing plants, mainly in
the Southern ports of China, rely heavily on such imports.
The introduction of new restrictive biosafety rules in 2002, only months after China
entered the WTO, stipulated that every shipment of GM crops had to be issued a safety
certificate based on risk assessment. Owing to the short timeframe within which the rules
were introduced, US shipments of soybeans were held up temporarily, leading to a noticeable
fall in US soybean exports (Rugaber 2002). The US government accused China of ‘back-
door’ protectionism aimed at manipulating the burgeoning trade in soybeans and complained
about the uncertain nature of the new biosafety rules, which in their view failed to give clear
guidance on documentation requirements and allowed Chinese authorities to delay a decision
for up to 270 days, the timeframe in the Cartagena Protocol (interview with official from US
embassy in China). China eventually gave in to sustained diplomatic pressure from Wash-
ington and issued interim safety certificates to facilitate uninterrupted imports of soybeans
before issuing formal three-year certificates in February 2004 (China Daily 2004). The
climb-down by the Chinese authorities and shift from a restrictive to a permissive stance vis-
a`-vis GM soybean imports underscores the ongoing effort to strike a balance between
domestic agricultural needs, biosafety and global trade imperatives.
In South Africa, some domains of GMO policy remain clearly permissive and aligned
with a US regulatory approach. This is particularly evident for GM food labelling—South
Africa currently does not require labelling of food with GM ingredients (Biowatch 2008).
The Ministry of Health (a pro-biotechnology branch of government) relies upon the
US-promoted notion of substantial equivalence of GM with non-GM food in dealing with
this issue (interviews with representatives of the Health Ministry and civil society; Wolson
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2007). The question of mandatory labelling has been a contentious point of debate with
regard to the GMO Act and its amendments, but has also recently resurfaced in debates
over a draft Consumer Protection Bill, presented to parliament in early 2008. This bill
initially included a requirement for compulsory labelling of food with GM ingredients, but
this was removed from the latest draft, partly as a result of opposition from the Ministry of
Agriculture (Biowatch 2008).
In general, with the exception of the last year or so, the last two decades have been a
period of intense activity in South Africa in the field of GM research and development,
with a growing number of crops gaining approval and being grown commercially. Fur-
thermore, while NGOs push for a restrictive policy, supporters of genetic engineering play
an active role in seeking to influence policy directions. The dominant pro-biotechnology
group, AfricaBIO, is heavily involved in capacity building in the region, often in con-
junction with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (Wolson 2006). US
influence is prominent in regional capacity-building initiatives, seen by critics as a way to
promote the US regulatory model.
In sum, GMO policies in Mexico, China and South Africa contain both permissive and
restrictive elements. Contrary to expectations that key developing countries’ domestic
GMO policy choices would converge around either the US or EU regulatory model, policy
choices in each of the three countries examined above continue to exhibit a significant
degree of diversity, a diversity that belies suggestions that developing countries will
inevitably have to embrace either a US or an EU regulatory approach. Furthermore, our
analysis suggests that the peculiar mix of permissive and restrictive policy elements dis-
cernible in each of these three countries cannot be reduced to incoherence or even chaos in
policy-making, but rather reflects an ongoing attempt to balance competing priorities and
interests, within the domestic context but also at the domestic–international nexus.
It is worth noting that the three countries examined here have followed largely similar
trajectories in developing their domestic GMO frameworks. They have gone from pro-
motion of agricultural biotechnology under the Ministry of Agriculture in the early 1990s
to the introduction of more restrictive elements by the late 1990s, coinciding with nego-
tiation of the Cartagena Protocol and the EU moratorium, and contributing to a greater role
domestically for the Ministry of Environment. Notwithstanding this shared trajectory,
however, there is little discernible convergence within each of these countries towards
either an EU or US model in domestic GMO policy choices. Instead, each of these
countries displays different permutations of permissive and restrictive GMO policies in
response to specific trade and domestic imperatives.
In the case of China, a concern with traditional exports to European and other Asian
markets calls for a restrictive approach to GMO trade and production, while growing
reliance on US imports has simultaneously created incentives for a more permissive
approach. Neither of these two external influences has come to dominate GMO policy.
Conflicting international influences are employed by domestic interest groups—within and
outside the core state—to shape GMO policy, without either side gaining control over the
regulatory process. China’s biotechnology policy has thus come to include elements of
both US- and EU-style regulation, and the political leadership is intent on maintaining a
finely balanced approach that secures a significant degree of political choice within
competing external constraints.
For Mexico and South Africa, trade with the US and other GMO producing countries
also influences policy directions. A concern with losing EU markets for non-GM agri-
cultural commodity exports is not as strong a countervailing force in these two countries as
it is currently for China. One could then assume that the neoliberal thrust of economic and
128 R. Falkner, A. Gupta
123
agricultural policy would push both countries more unambiguously in the direction of
openness in GMO research and trade, aligned with a US approach. As we see, however,
this is not entirely the case. In Mexico, the key counter-force to an overall permissive
policy is to be found in cultural attitudes to biodiversity, and particularly the perception of
a unique relationship between Mexico and maize. As the analysis reveals, concerns over
the cultural, social, ecological and health consequences of importing or planting GM maize
force Mexico, too, to balance both openness and caution in its domestic policy. This is
further stimulated by the fact that functioning democratic politics, now taking hold in
Mexico, ensures that different voices are at least heard.
The democratization of risk governance can also be observed in South Africa, where an
active NGO community critical of the country’s approach to GMOs in agriculture has been
going head to head with domestic constituencies supportive of biotechnology. This conflict
has influenced domestic regulatory developments. Partly, this has been possible because of
rights enshrined in the new South African constitution, and progressive right to information
legislation, which allows citizen groups to hold regulatory authorities accountable for
decisions they take. These groups have also, however, been able to evoke South Africa’s
obligations under the Cartagena Protocol as a way to further legitimize their push for a
more restrictive approach. A more restrictive trend in South African policy can be
attributed to these forces, together with key trade and economic concerns that do not pull in
the direction of openness alone.
What we see, then, is not convergence to one of the two regulatory nodes of the US or
the EU but rather a ‘sustainable diversity’ (Millstone and Zwanenberg 2003, p. 664) in
GMO policy approaches in the South. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that this diversity
is related not only, as Millstone and Zwanenberg posit, to interpretive flexibility of
international obligations—such as those contained in the WTO SPS Agreement or the
Cartagena Protocol—or to persisting scientific uncertainties and conflicts over safe use of
GMOs, allowing for differing local interpretations and policy choices. It is related, more
broadly, to how competing trade imperatives interact with domestic politics and priorities,
with multiple domestic nodes of power and actor coalitions negotiating policy directions
that combine both restrictive and permissive elements.
5 Conclusion: transatlantic regulatory polarization and diversity
in southern GMO policies
We began this analysis by asking whether regulatory convergence in the area of GMO
policy is discernible in key developing countries. Numerous studies of globalization have
suggested that greater global economic and political integration is pushing countries
towards regulatory convergence, and in the field of GMO politics, the idea of regulatory
polarization around the US and EU regulatory models has gained ground. Our study has
sought to shed light on the nature and limits of this convergence trend, and to investigate
the ways in which international forces are transmitted into the domestic context of regu-
latory policies in the South.
Our findings reveal unambiguously that GMO policy-making in the South is indeed
influenced by global economic and trade considerations. All three countries are encour-
aging new technologies in agriculture as part of their effort to promote economic
liberalization and greater competitiveness in international markets. A key motivation
underlying biotechnology policy in all three countries is fear of being left out of the next
technological revolution, with its consequences for international competitiveness.
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However, while global trade and economic imperatives are important, they do not push in
one clear direction. As a result of the GMO conflict between the US and the EU, international
market imperatives can have two different effects, often simultaneously: they may promote
rapid adoption of agricultural biotechnology and reliance on a narrowly defined, ‘sound
science’ based approval system of GMOs; or they may push towards a more restrictive,
precautionary, approach that ensures biosafety as well as a future for non-GM exports.
As has become evident from these cases, international factors, such as trade links,
bilateral relations and international regimes pose constraints but also enable domestic
interests within and outside the state to pursue competing objectives. There is no
straightforward transmission of international imperatives into domestic ones; their rele-
vance in a domestic context depends on the mobilization of domestic interests, the creation
of actor coalitions and the alliances formed with key representatives of state institutions. It
is in this battleground of domestic politics that—despite differences in the political con-
stitution of our three cases—transnational regulatory polarization plays itself out, with
domestic institutional frameworks and interplay of actors providing a filter through which
international influences pass. The net result of this complex international–domestic
interaction is a more diverse field of regulatory policies and outcomes than is commonly
acknowledged in debates on international regulatory polarization.
Finally, an intriguing implication of our analysis is that, rather than simply constraining
policy choices, transatlantic regulatory polarization may well have empowering conse-
quences for a diverse range of domestic actors. At the very least, the transatlantic GMO
conflict has helped to stimulate a more comprehensive and inclusive domestic political
debate on how to govern this contested new technology, in each of the three countries
examined here. Because of its emphasis on enhancing importing country choice, the global
regime of the Cartagena Protocol has contributed further to such a democratization of
debate and broadening of domestic policy agendas (for specific analysis of the Cartagena
Protocol’s influence, see Gupta and Falkner 2006). However, it is clear that the policy
space for biotechnology choices that exists today in key developing countries is not
without boundaries. Leading biotechnology countries in the South remain exposed to
various external pressures and are constrained by dependence on export markets and
commitment to international regime norms. It is therefore appropriate to think of devel-
oping country autonomy in forging policy directions more in terms of ‘‘bounded
autonomy’’ (Newell 2007). This caveat is all the more important when we consider the
position of smaller developing countries that are less advanced in biotechnology research
or development of domestic biosafety regulations.
This notwithstanding, the above discussion reveals that accounts of globalization
fuelling regulatory homogenization, convergence and polarization fail to capture the sig-
nificant degree of regulatory diversity that currently exists in key developing countries.
Globalization of agricultural biotechnology is progressing but it is far from producing
convergence (binary or otherwise) in the South.
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